Abstract We develop a model of price dispersion to distinguish the impact of price discrimination from that of peak load pricing schemes or atypical competition resulting from the financial difficulties of the early 1990s. By utilizing three alternative measures of dispersion and appealing to economic theory for our specification, we find robust results suggesting an estrangement between price dispersion and price discrimination. While some discrimination continues to persist at monopolized endpoints, most dispersion is associated with fare wars and peak load pricing schemes.
Introduction
The rampant dispersion in domestic air fares has captured the attention of economists and travelers alike. Such diversity in prices could be driven by differing sources. First, fare wars result from a failed attempt among the major carriers to sustain marked up prices and create high variances. Second, discounted fares may be found in the absence of a fare war. After accounting for differences in costs, such dispersion could be explained by monopoly power and be labeled price discrimination. Unraveling the determinants of price dispersion is a 1 necessary step in understanding the balance (or imbalance) of power in this industry and evaluating the impact of price discrimination on pricing policies. While both fare wars and price discrimination may occur in the airline industry; however, the first may have eroded a carrier's ability to achieve the second. Price discrimination, a carefully planned price scheme, robs travelers of consumer surplus and fare wars, whereas a price cutting, an unplanned reaction to an aggressive carrier, increases consumer surplus; consequently, the welfare implications of price dispersion may be changing over time. We identify the factors contributing to price dispersion in the airline industry with an emphasis on the existence and successful uses of market power among major airline carriers. By distinguishing markets with monopoly power from those where competitive shocks lead to fare wars, we investigate the dichotomous origins of price dispersion.
The airline price dispersion literature was initiated by Borenstein and Rose (1994) who made a valuable contribution. We extend this literature on several points. First, our data is 2 One theoretical explanation for this outcome may be found in the literature regarding Edgeworth cycles 3 where price undercutting occurs after a demand shock. While the data available for airline markets is not conducive to testing for such cycles, we maintain this idea as a possible source of price dispersion. For more details, see Slade (1989) or Maskin and Tirole (1988) . more recent and comprehensive, comprising a cross section of 1332 observations for each carrier serving the routes in our sample. Each carrier/route combination is observed for 12 quarters from 1990 through 1992. During this time, fare wars proliferated and the financial challenges of the passenger airline industry escalated. Second, in contrast to earlier studies which used a single dispersion measure, we verify the robustness of our results by defining price dispersion under three alternatives; the Gini Coefficient, the Atkinson index and the entropy index. Third, we include many airports in our sample since most financially viable carriers hold monopolies in a subset of small airports. Identifying price uniformity or dispersion in these niches helps to unravel the impact of market power. Finally, to assess the impact of regional competition on price dispersion, we identify geographical areas with multiple airports.
We use our panel of data in a two-way random effects model. We incorporate market power proxies, measures of market structure, "atypically" competition indicators, multiple airport regions dummies, proxies for peak load pricing, and cost variables. We find that price dispersion in the airline industry is mostly related to peak load pricing and the fare wars of the early 1990s. However, price discrimination does exist to some extent. Additionally, 3 competition from Southwest Airlines reduces dispersion.
In the next section, we discuss various sources of price dispersion as they have been identified in economic theory. The third section is a discussion of the measures of dispersion used in the analysis. In the fourth section we review our list of regressors. The empirical model and subsequent analyses are presented in the fifth and sixth sections, and we provide concluding remarks in the final section.
Sources of Price Dispersion
Numerous origins of price dispersion have been identified in the economic literature. Most often dispersion is attributed to price discrimination strongly implying market power.
However, it is possible that over a period of time (as may be the case for our quarterly data) fare wars erupt when a carrier, usually with financial difficulties, begins offering discounted fares to attract customers. The peak load pricing literature offers an alternative explanation.
This strategy is used to smooth the utilization of very expensive capital equipment and reduce congestion at peak usage times. Further, price differentials can be associated with cost differentials. While controlling for both peak load effects and cost differentials, this study tests for evidence of price discrimination and atypical competitive situations as dichotomous explanations that cannot be directly observed with quarterly data.
It seems paradoxical that both non-competitive and competitive forces can lead to price dispersion. Consider first non-competitive, or planned, price dispersion. Customers may be charged differing prices when the seller has sufficient information concerning the customers' elasticities. This type of price dispersion, i.e. discrimination, is part of a carrier's carefully orchestrated plan to maximize profits. Because some airlines continuously update fares offered, we expect some routes to be characterized by first or second degree discrimination. Such planned price dispersion would be associated with higher average price mark-ups, hub dominant carriers, and, possibly, more concentrated markets.
Conversely, price dispersion may be unplanned. If airlines attempt to maintain prices at a level above marginal cost, but lack sufficient market power to sustain those prices, fare wars may result. Reflecting a weakness in market power, the proliferation of fare wars over the past few years suggests a cause of price dispersion in this industry. This type of dispersion would occur over a period of time and is not directly observable with quarterly data. However, fare wars could be detected ex post if they were properly attributed to atypical competition (such as competition from financial desperate firms or from Southwest Airlines), lower average price mark-ups or additional competition from regional airports.
As overall profitability of the industry has declined during our sample period, the variety and intensity of profit maximizing efforts may have changed dramatically. Given the multiple product nature of the airline industry with significant multiple market contact, price Given the variety of indices the literature provides and regards as useful, no standard index can be 4 identified. We do not use variance or standard deviation in ticket prices as these measures are scale sensitive. This is a reinforcement of an index's validity. If a new index were to reverse rankings on a large scale, it 5 would not likely be accepted. When a large class of indices will yield similar rankings while providing different types of information, then those indices are valuable in a collective sense.
In a similar sense, Kwoka (1985) demonstrated that various concentration measures, which were highly 6 correlated, exhibited differences in their explanatory power when used in regression analysis. dispersion could result from various profit maximizing strategies. These strategies may vary not only across markets but also through time. Our unique data set permits us to distinguish between these non-competitive and competitive markets and to weigh the importance of various strategies undertaken by the major carriers.
Measuring Price Dispersion
In Figure 1 we show a "typical" price distribution. Ticket prices are ordered from highest to lowest and then plotted to illustrate the variety that exists for many routes in our sample.
The measurement of inequality has a rich history in the economic literature with the bulk of it pertaining to the evaluation of income inequality. Similarly, the dispersion of prices is an example of price inequality which may be quantified into an index just as income inequality may. Borenstein and Rose (1994) rely on the Gini coefficient to measure dispersion. While the Gini is a well known and well accepted index, it is one of many indices used to describe inequality. The formulation of any index imposes a specific interpretation of the underlying distribution and captures it uniquely. As such, any statistical results or ordinal conclusions obtained from using a particular index may be unique to that index. To reduce the possibility of index specific results, we utilize three indices to measure price dispersion; each possesses different properties and captures differing aspects of the price distribution. 4 In the statistical analysis below, we estimate our model using the Gini, the Atkinson inequality measure and the entropy measures of price dispersion. Index rankings are often consistent with each other (Basmann, Hayes and Slottje, 1994) ; however, incorporating three 
the statistical model below are consistent across indices, we find cases where they are notably different. Emphasizing different portions of the price distribution is enlightening for identifying the impact of peak load pricing strategies, regional competition, and carrier effects.
This analysis validates the usefulness of multiple indices and brings into question the amount of faith that can be placed on any analysis that is limited to a single inequality measure. With this in mind, we review the Gini, the Atkinson, and the entropy.
The Gini coefficient tends to give more weight to the middle portion of a distribution and, therefore, is rather insensitive to the tails of the distribution. While the Gini coefficient is a well established index, the others we use are less common. The Atkinson (1970) measure is an axiomatically based index bound by zero and one. The functional form of this index is where n is the number of observations, p is the price of observation i, µ is the mean price and i ε is a choice parameter. Unlike the Gini, the parameter ε allows the measurer to alter the portion of the distribution that is emphasized. For example a large ε would emphasize inequality in the lower end of the distribution whereas a small ε would create an index that is more sensitive to inequality in the upper end of the distribution. We chose an ε of 0.5 which is relatively small and will be sensitive to variations in "higher" prices. Therefore, the regressions with an Atkinson dependent variable should be particularly informative about dispersion above the average price and its relationship with market power. The other index we utilize is the entropy measure which is based in information theory. The functional form of the entropy is All three of these measures are replication invariant and scale invariant; the Atkinson and entropy are 7 symmetric. Replication invariance implies that the index is independent of the number of observations; scale invariance implies that the index is not influenced by price level; and symmetry implies that the observations enter the index anonymously (the Gini is not symmetric because the observations must be entered from smallest to largest).
The entropy index is more sensitive to variation in prices at the lower end of the distribution.
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Thus, if a coefficient is significant in the entropy regression and not the others, that independent variable would be more important in determining inequality in the lower end of the distribution. In this way, we can examine the importance of various measures of market structure vs. atypical competition on different parts of the fare distribution.
Characterizing Price Dispersion
Given the many potential sources of price dispersion, we include a plethora of variables designed to disentangle the relationship between market power and price dispersion. First, we consider the impact of both market power and market structure by incorporating a hub indicator, a price mark-up proxy, an various market structure variables. Second, we have a number of variables describing the nature of competitive on a given route. For example, we identify competition from a bankrupt or a failed carrier, from Southwest Airlines, from other airports in the region, etc. Third, we control for cost differentials and peak load pricing.
Fourth, we include carrier dummies to absorb the impact of differing strategies among the various players in the airline industry. Full descriptions for all variables are included in the appendix.
Market Power and Market Structure Variables
We wish to identify the extent to which market power is associated with price dispersion.
While it has been argued by Lott and Roberts that these price differentials can be attributed to peak load pricing and cost differences, Borenstein and Rose found evidence of price discrimination among monopolistically competitive carriers. Given the dramatic changes that By using average price per mile, we are implicitly assuming that the average cost curve is flat over the 8 relevant range. To validate this assumption, we appeal to Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) and Caves, Christiansen, and Deiwert (1992) who find constant returns to scale in airline markets.
The simultaneous inclusion of these variable is likely to present a multicollinearity problems as they are 9 highly correlated.
have occurred in the airlines since the mid 1980s, it is appropriate to re-examine this question in light of our more current data.
Hub dominance and price mark-up have been used as measures of market power. Borenstein (1989) finds evidence that airlines have greater market power at their own hubs.
Accordingly, we include a dummy variable, HUB, which indicates a hub at either (or both) endpoint(s) of a route. A second indicator of market power is suggested by the Lerner index which measures price mark-ups. While estimating this index for each carrier/route observation is beyond the scope of this paper, a readily available proxy for the associated price mark-up may be obtained by calculating average fare per mile, PPM.
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Regardless of the connection, or lack thereof, between market structure and market power, we control for the influence of market structure. Market share, MKTSHR, is considered using average endpoint Herfindahl, AHERF, and route Herfindahl, RHERF, as two different specifications of our model. Because we initially found a highly nonlinear effect 9 of MKTSHR on price dispersion which is highly correlated with our concentration indices, we consider MKTSHR raised to the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th power and interact it with AHERF and RHERF to help improve our specification. Unfortunately, the inclusion of RHERF and AHERF may introduce some simultaneity with our dependent variable if our fare war theory is correct. Fare wars are theoretically possible in concentrated markets, when unsustainable price mark-ups are attempted by a group of oligopolist. When dynamic oligopoly behavior becomes a major source of price dispersion, concentration indices will be endogenous. To address this possible endogeneity, we instrument concentration indices. To capture synergy
Although the deterioration of the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm weakens the causality of 10 market structure to market power, excluding market structure would be remiss. We also want to be sure that we control for the effects of market structure.
A listing of airports in a common region are listed with the variable definitions in Appendix B.
11 between market power variables and market structure variables, we interact PPM with the our descriptors of market structure and with HUB.
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We also investigate the role of round-trip fares in price discrimination. Since carriers usually require a Saturday night stay to obtain a round-trip discount, the such tickets clearly appeal to the higher elasticity customer and may be indicative of price discrimination.
However, requiring Saturday night stays is also a method for smoothing aircraft utilization and may be more closely identified with peak load pricing. Therefore, we interact PPM with ROUNTRIP to capture the price discrimination aspect of this variable. ROUNTRIP is relegated to the group of variables describing peak load pricing.
Unusual Competition
While the variables depicting market structure and market power provide a basis for distinguishing between routes with or without competition, we also include variables to We also consider the overall impact of regional competition on price dispersion. We include dummy variables for flights with endpoints in the Chicago area, the Dallas area, the Denver area, the Detroit area, the Houston area, the Los Angeles area, the CharlotteGreenville, SC area, the New York City area, the San Francisco area, and the Washington, D.C. area. These dummy variables are signified by REGIONYY (where "YY" signifies the endpoint). Positive coefficients on these variables would be indicative of competitive forces driving price dispersion and evidence that market power has been eroded in this industry since the mid 1980s.
Peak Load Pricing
Lott and Roberts have argued that the airlines use price dispersion to alleviate congestion at peak usage times. For example, to get a discounted fare, usually a consumer must book a round trip flight and include a Saturday night in his travel plans as airports tend to be less busy on the weekends. For this reason, we consider the percentage of round-trip fares, ROUNTRIP, to proxy peak load pricing. Moreover, we argue that peak load pricing is more likely to be practiced on routes where there is a higher variance in load factors, LVLOADF, and plane sizes, LVPSIZE. However, since we suspect a simultaneity problem with these variables, they are lagged one period. We also interact these terms creating PSIZLOAD.
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Cost Differentials
Routes with significant differences in costs are likely to have more complicated rate structure and more price dispersion. 
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While the SCP paradigm directs causality from market structure to price, price may, in turn, affect market 13 structure as well.
Only route/carrier combinations appearing in both data sources for all time periods are included.
(3)
flight. Since we suspect that these two variables feed off each other, we include an interaction term, DISTSTOP.
Carrier Dummies
We include carrier dummies for the 13 regional and national carriers in our sample.
Instruments
Because we suspect a simultaneity bias with AHERF and RHERF, we instrument these variables with the number of scheduled flights, TSCHED, and the number of carriers serving a route, NUMCARR, respectively. 
The Statistical Model
A balanced panel allows us to use a random effects model with a two-way error component both by carrier/route and time series according to the Da Silva (1975) method. Given the 14 time series nature of the data, the error structure includes an moving average (1) process to control for autocorrelation. The model we estimate is as follows:
The log odds ratio of x equals ln x/(1-x). Using this ratio converts our indices which are bound by zero 15 and one to unbounded variables; therefore, least squares estimation is valid. This is in contrast to Borenstein and Rose who use 521 routes and 11 carriers.
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Recall that the Gini emphasized the middle of the distribution, the Atkinson, the upper end and the 17 entropy, the lower end.
The equation is estimated with the Gini log odds ratio, the Atkinson log odds ratio and the entropy index as alternative dependent variables.
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The data employed includes fifteen carriers traveling on 973 routes from the first quarter of 1990 through the 4th quarter of 1992. Because several variables were lagged to 16 reduce simultaneity bias, data points begin with the second quarter of 1990, providing 1332 carrier route observations for 11 time periods, or 14,652 observations. A full description of the data is available in the appendix.
The independent variables are arranged by group in equation (3). The * variables denote indicators of market power and market structure with the previously discussed interaction terms. Positive coefficients among this group of variable would provide evidence of price discrimination. The µ coefficients are associated with atypical competition potentially forcing carriers to discount fares and the 2 variables denote endpoints at various multiple airport regions. Accordingly, positive coefficients should be indicative of fare wars by carriers that are not able to maintain high price mark-ups. The ( and $ variables measure the proxy effects for peak load pricing and cost differentials, respectively. And finally, T denotes individual carrier effects.
Results from the Statistical Model
In Table 2 we report the GLS coefficients and their marginal probabilities for all three measures of price dispersion. Hausman's test for endogeneity values for RHERF and 17 AHERF indicating that RHERF is endogenous while AHERF is not at a 5% level of significance. Therefore, we estimated our model with RHERFHAT, its fitted value, and used RHERFHAT in all related interaction terms.
Initially, we considered MKTSHR to be an important indicator of market structure and included it without controlling for concentration. We first found MKTSHR insignificant; however, our intuition led us to doubt the validity of this result. To explore MKTSHR further, we divided our data into subsets by level of concentration. From this exercise we discovered a robust and positive relationship between dispersion and MKTSHR for the observations in the lowest and highest quartile of RHERF. Conversely, we discovered a robust and significantly negative relationship in the lowest and highest quartile of AHERF.
From these contradictory results, we realized that MKTSHR has a highly non-linear relationship with dispersion that is closely linked to one's definition of concentration (e.g.
either by route or airport). Accordingly, our final estimation includes several exponential terms (MKTSHR , MKTSHR , and MKTSHR ) and interaction terms between MKTSHR 2 3 4
and ZHERF (Z=A, R) to improve our specification. When all these terms are included, with the exception of RHERFHAT, everything is significant and robust. Unfortunately, the collective coefficients from these variables do not provide a conclusive result about the role of market share on price dispersion Ultimately, we want to know if market power creates price discrimination (suggesting that consumer surplus is lost) and if market structure plays a role in allowing price discrimination to occur. We do notice a consistently positive coefficient for MKTSAHRF, suggesting more dispersion from dominant carriers at monopolized endpoints. This result indicates price discrimination at isolated airports. The positive impact of PPMMKTS supports price discrimination as well as indicating an increase in dispersion when price markups are higher for firms with large market shares. Conversely, a negative PPMHUB coefficient shows hub dominant carriers with higher mark-ups exhibiting uniform prices. We find a significant, negative effect from PPMROUND refutes that the expected link expected between round-trip fares and price discrimination. Peak load pricing, rather than an exploitation of market power, is a more evident. Therefore, while price discrimination is practiced, hub dominance leads to a more uniform pricing policy. Ultimately, we find some verification that market concentration (market structure) is linked to behavior as the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm would suggest; however, since most highly concentrated markets contains endpoints in areas with low population densities, monopolization may less lucrative for airlines than some might expect. The larger majority of passengers (traveling through hubs) may expect more uniform fares.
Unusual Competition
A second issue we hoped to address was the link between "atypical" competition and fare wars, which disperse prices. From this section of variables, we hope to capture opportunities for demand shocks which may be the impetus for a fare war. While COMPBANK, competition from a carrier in bankruptcy, robustly increases dispersion, the converse is true for COMPFAIL, competition from a failed carrier. The opposite impacts of bankrupt carrier that continue to operate and bankrupt carriers that dissolved during the early 1990s may reveal a weakness in failed carriers that transcends their financial woes.
An unsurprising result is the negative coefficient for COMPSW. Southwest Airlines has proven to be such a powerful force in airline pricing that competing carriers have lost their ability to sell higher priced tickets to even the lowest elasticity customers. The popular press has reported similar findings of traditional carrier's reactions to a Southwest entry and our estimation does not dispute them.
Our set of multiple airport region dummies substantiate our guess regarding additional competition from other airports. By and large, we do find a consistently positive and significant relationship between multiple airports and dispersion.
Peak Load Pricing
Given the negative and significant effect of ROUNTRIP, we find support for peak load pricing. We suspect that claims of using complicated pricing schemes to smooth out utilization of aircraft is a likely explanation for price dispersion in the early 1990s.
Cost Differences
We get mixes results regarding the impact of cost differences on dispersion. Again, we admit to the possibility of poor proxies.
Carrier Effects
We are particularly interested in the pricing policies of Southwest Airlines; however, our results are not uniform. While Southwest has a significantly negative impact when we emphasize the lower end of the price distribution by using an entropy, this result does not carry through to the middle or upper end of the distribution. Perhaps the inconsistency we notice is due a lack of data for Southwest above the lower end of the price distribution.
To check the robustness of our results, we estimated our model with three different, but highly correlated, measures of dispersion. We find that most results are robust to our selection of indices, although some notable differences arise. In particular, the coefficient for PPM is negative and significant for the Gini and Atkinson indices, while shows some positive and significant effects on the entropy. A similar reversal of sign (or significance) occurs with PPMMKTS, COMPSW, PSIZLOAD, and some of the carrier dummies. Recalling that the entropy gives greater emphasis to dispersion in the lower end of the price distribution than the other two measures, one may argue that the entropy reveals more about fare wars, whereas the others reveal more about the exploitation of low elasticity customers. More generally, this difference suggests that results from a single index are not robust and might be misleading.
Conclusions
The market power enjoyed by national carriers the mid 1980s gave way to the turmoil of the early 1990s. The financial difficulties of most national carriers, the rash of fare wars which proliferated during our sample period, and the expansion of Southwest Airlines out of the southwest have deteriorated carriers' abilities to exploit market power via price discrimination. While price dispersion prevails in the 1990s, the underlying forces causing such dispersion differ. Now policies which allowed carriers to exploit the low elasticities of business travelers in the mid 1980s have evolved into a source of consumer surplus for high elasticity travelers in the 1990s as discounted fares become more commonplace. Air travelers enjoy lower fares if their schedules are flexible because carriers make every effort to smooth capacity utilization via peak load pricing schemes. Further, increased competition from low cost entrants, bankrupt carriers, and multiple airports have eroded the producer surplus enjoyed just a decade ago. While monopolies at isolated endpoints exhibit some evidence of price discrimination persisting through the 90s, the ability of carriers to proliferate this practice is severely dampened.
While we have some evidence that market structure plays a role in pricing policies, the connection between market power and market structure is not straightforward. The multi market nature of this industry allows carriers a variety of schemes to maximize profits but does not protect them from the instability of dynamic oligopoly. The vulnerability of national carriers, with extensive networks of multi market contact, and the coincident reversal of fortune, is perhaps our most striking result.
Carriers with excessive financial difficulties also play an important role in price dispersion. Desperate to sell tickets, carriers in bankruptcy offer discounts that spark reactions from their more viable competitors. The resulting fare wars create dispersion among the competitors of bankrupt carriers. Further, Southwest Airlines has reduced price dispersion (most likely moving airfares to a lower uniform level) and received tremendous media attention while doing so.
Finally, we find some inconsistencies in the significance and signs of our results across indices. Therefore, the measure used to capture price dispersion is important and results specific to any index are subjective.
Appendix A -Data
Since the airline industry is still subject to some regulation by the Department of 3) Any tickets with more than one change of plane per direction of travel.
4) Tickets with any origin or destination outside the United States.
5) Interline tickets (those tickets where services are provided by more than one carrier).
6) Any tickets that were less than $10 or greater than $750 each way or $20 and $1500 round-trip, respectively, as these are assumed to be frequent flier tickets, chartered flights or input errors.
There are 1,332 carrier/route observations representing 973 routes selected from these two data sets to use for these analysis. These are the only carrier/route combinations that are present in both data sets for all time periods among the top 100 airports in the US and represent roughly 30% of all itineraries in the DB1A. The use of the T100 somewhat restricts the choice set of routes since it is a segment based data source. For an observation to occur on the T100, there must be a non-stop flight between the endpoints. Conversely, the DB1A
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has observations on almost any combination of segments imaginable between various endpoints. It should be noted that inconsistencies in the interpretation of the variables extracted from these data sets may arise given their differences.
The most recent 12 quarters of data were used for the analysis ( Tobit maximum likelihood estimation rather than least squares. Since the entropy index is not bound, and least squares estimation is possible, we prefer a method that allows for a homogeneous estimation technique. The second alternative, which does allow such homogeneity, is to convert the Atkinson and the Gini to unbound variables by calculating their log odds ratios. The log odds ratio of P equals ln P/(1-P) and is not bound as is the original variable.
Independent Variables
Market Power variables with * coefficients:
HUB A 0/1 dummy variable indicating that one or both endpoints of a route are major hubs for at least one airport. Source: Bauer (1992) MKTSHR This is the market share of the carrier for the period and route in the observation.
MKTSHR , MKTSHR , and MKTSHR are squared, cubed, 4th power terms, resp. Source: Wisconsin.
